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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from 
an order entered in an action that plaintiff-appellee Joseph 
Stevens, a former employee of a subsidiary of defendant-
appellant Santander Holdings USA Inc. (“Santander”), brought 
against Santander seeking to recover benefits from two disability 
benefit plans that Santander provided for its eligible employees.  
As an employee of a Santander subsidiary, Sovereign Bank, 
Stevens participated in these plans, a short-term disability plan 
(“STD”) and a long-term disability plan (“LTD”).  In October 
2010, Stevens sought STD benefits through the administrator of 
Santander’s plans, defendant-appellant Liberty Life Assurance 
Company of Boston, doing business as Liberty Mutual (“Liberty 
Mutual”).  After it initially awarded STD benefits to Stevens, 
Liberty Mutual determined that Stevens no longer suffered from a 
qualifying disability, a determination that led it to terminate his 
STD benefits.  Stevens responded by bringing this action pursuant 
to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., seeking reinstatement of the payment of 
benefits.  The District Court found that Liberty Mutual’s decision 
to terminate Stevens’s STD benefits was arbitrary and capricious 
and remanded the case to the plan administrator with instructions 
to reinstate Stevens’s STD benefit payments retroactively and to 
determine his eligibility for LTD benefit payments. 
 Santander and Liberty Mutual appealed to this Court, but 
Stevens moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, 
arguing that the District Court’s remand order to the plan 
administrator was not a “final decision” appealable pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 at that time.  Before reaching the merits of this 
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appeal, we must determine whether the District Court’s remand 
order is presently final and appealable under § 1291 or is 
otherwise appealable.  Upon review, we hold that the District 
Court has retained jurisdiction over the case and that the order 
from which appellants have appealed is not yet appealable.  We 
therefore will dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
  A.  Factual Background and Administrative  
        Proceedings 
 Sovereign Bank employed Stevens as a Retail Investment 
Financial Consultant II from October 2, 2006, through October 5, 
2010.  During his employment, Stevens received treatment for 
ankylosing spondylitis, a chronic inflammatory disease.  As we 
have indicated, Santander sponsored and funded an STD benefits 
plan for its employees and engaged Liberty Mutual as the plan’s 
administrator.  But even though Liberty Mutual was the plan 
administrator, Santander retained final decision-making authority 
in the review of STD claims and Santander paid any benefits 
awarded.  Under the STD plan, a covered employee, such as 
Stevens, is considered “disabled” if objective medical evidence 
demonstrates that he is unable to perform the “material and 
substantial” duties of his own occupation, in Stevens’s case as a 
Retail Investment Financial Consultant II.  “Material and 
substantial” duties are those normally required to be performed 
that cannot be eliminated or modified.     
 Santander also purchased an LTD benefit plan from 
Liberty Mutual.  The administration and funding of the LTD plan 
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differed from that of the STD plan because Liberty Mutual both 
administered and had final decision-making authority under the 
LTD plan and paid benefits awarded under the plan.  To qualify 
for LTD benefits, an employee needs to show that he is “unable 
to perform the Material and Substantial duties of his Own 
Occupation” for an “elimination period” of 180 days, and 
thereafter cannot perform these duties for the next 24 months.  
During the “elimination period,” an employee does not receive 
benefits under the LTD plan, but he can receive LTD benefits 
during the 24-month “Own Occupation” period that follows.  
However, during the elimination period the employee may be 
eligible for STD benefits, and thus the two plans complement 
each other as LTD benefits can start when STD benefits stop.1  
After the expiration of the 24-month “Own Occupation” period, 
an employee will be eligible for LTD benefits only if he 
demonstrates that he is “unable to perform, with reasonable 
continuity, the Material and Substantial Duties of Any 
Occupation.”  (J.A. 67.)    
 On or about October 5, 2010, Stevens began a leave of 
absence from Sovereign Bank due to worsening symptoms related 
to his medical condition.  Consequently, Stevens filed a claim 
with Liberty Mutual for STD payments as he asserted that he was 
subject to qualifying physical restrictions and cognitive 
impairments.  Liberty Mutual reviewed records of Stevens’s 
treating rheumatologist and approved his request for STD 
                                                   
1 In his brief Stevens indicates that “[t]he short-term disability 
(‘STD’) coverage provide[s] for up to 25 weeks of benefits (177 
[sic] days of disability) following a 5 day elimination period.”  
(Appellee’s br. 5.) 
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benefits through December 21, 2010.2  In December, Liberty 
Mutual reviewed updated medical information and approved 
payment of STD benefits through February 5, 2011.   
 Liberty Mutual again reviewed Stevens’s updated records 
in February 2011, this time determining that his medical reports 
did not substantiate Stevens’s subjective complaints of pain.  
Accordingly, it forwarded the case for review to an independent 
physician, Dr. Sara Kramer, a board certified physician in internal 
medicine and rheumatology.  After Dr. Kramer reviewed 
Stevens’s records and spoke with Stevens’s treating 
rheumatologist, she concluded that Stevens could return to work 
provided that he was allowed certain accommodations, including 
being permitted to stretch and change positions as needed 
throughout the course of an eight-hour day.3  Liberty Mutual 
subsequently informed Stevens that his condition no longer met 
the definition of disability and therefore it would not award him 
additional STD benefits.  The termination of Stevens’s eligibility 
for STD benefits effectively rendered Stevens ineligible for LTD 
benefits as he could not demonstrate that he was unable to 
perform his own occupation’s duties throughout the 180-day 
elimination period.   
                                                   
2 Stevens indicates that he also applied for and received 
temporary disability benefits from the State of New Jersey at the 
same time predicated on the same information that he supplied to 
Liberty Mutual to support his STD claim.  (Appellee’s br. 7-8.) 
 
3 Stevens asserts that Dr. Kramer spent a total of one hour and 15 
minutes reviewing his case and that Liberty Mutual did not ask 
Stevens to submit to a physical                                          
examination.  (Appellee’s br. 11-12.)  
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 After Liberty Mutual notified Stevens that he was not 
eligible for further STD benefits, Stevens filed a series of 
administrative appeals with Liberty Mutual that he supported 
with medical records and additional documentation.  In response 
to each of Stevens’s requests for review of additional 
information, Liberty Mutual enlisted medical professionals to 
evaluate the information in his record and the new information 
that he provided.  On November 10, 2011, Liberty Mutual made 
a final determination that Stevens was no longer eligible for STD 
benefits, and it provided its final recommendation and analysis to 
that end to Santander, which, in turn, approved the decision a 
short time thereafter.  Liberty Mutual then notified Stevens of the 
final decision to deny him further STD benefits.  
  B.  District Court Proceedings 
 On December 22, 2011, a little over a month after Liberty 
Mutual notified him of the final decision that he no longer 
qualified for STD benefits, Stevens filed this action in the District 
Court pursuant to ERISA, seeking both retroactive reinstatement 
of his STD benefits starting on February 5, 2011, and continuing 
through April 4, 2011, and LTD benefits starting on April 5, 
2011, the end of the elimination period.  The parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment, and on January 29, 2014, the 
District Court granted Stevens’s motion and denied Santander’s 
motion in an oral decision.  The Court pointed to “a number of 
procedural anomalies that can lead to a finding of an arbitrary and 
capricious termination” of Stevens’s STD benefits and explained 
that it was “most important” that “despite retaining final approval 
authority over the STD plan . . . Santander failed to conduct any 
meaningful independent review of [Stevens’s] file,” a procedure 
that the Court viewed as “‘rubber stamping’ Liberty’s benefit 
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determinations.”  (J.A. 19-20.)  The Court determined that the 
decision to terminate Stevens’s STD benefits and thus, in effect, 
to deny him LTD benefits “was not a product of reasoned 
decision making” and determined that the appropriate remedy 
was to (1) reinstate STD benefits because they had been 
terminated after being awarded and (2) remand Stevens’s claim to 
the plan administrator for full consideration of his eligibility for 
LTD benefits.  (Id. 4-5, 20-21.)  The Court entered a separate 
judgment on January 29, 2014, evidencing its determination and 
directing the clerk of court “to close this case.”  (Id. 5.)   
 Santander and Liberty Mutual timely appealed to this 
Court, but Stevens moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction.  In contending that we do not have jurisdiction, 
Stevens argues that the District Court’s January 29, 2014 
decision and judgment were not final because they did not resolve 
the amount of “Own Occupation” benefits to which he was 
entitled under the STD plan or his eligibility for benefits under the 
LTD plan.4  Santander and Liberty Mutual contend that the 
District Court’s decision was final because (1) the calculation of 
the amount of STD benefits owed to Stevens was a “ministerial” 
task not subject to genuine dispute, and (2) an analysis of 
Stevens’s eligibility for LTD benefits could be made separately 
from the other issues in this case.  They also cite as indicia of 
finality the District Court’s direction to its clerk to close the case 
and its entry of a separate judgment evidencing its determination.   
III.  DISCUSSION 
 As we have explained, prior to reaching the merits of an 
                                                   
4 As a matter of convenience, we usually will refer to the District 
Court’s decision and judgment as though they are a single order. 
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appeal, we determine if we have jurisdiction.  See Poole v. Family 
Court of New Castle Cnty., 368 F.3d 263, 264 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Courts of appeals most commonly have jurisdiction over appeals 
taken from “final decisions of the district courts of the United 
States.”  28 U.S.C § 1291.  Consequently, our first inquiry is to 
decide whether the District Court’s order remanding Stevens’s 
claim to the plan administrator was a final appealable order under 
§ 1291.  We analyze our jurisdiction under § 1291 primarily by 
applying the three-prong test we recognized in Papotto v. 
Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co., 731 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 
2013).  For the reasons that we will explain, our consideration of 
the Papotto test and the other cases that we discuss leads us to 
conclude that we do not have jurisdiction over the District 
Court’s order under § 1291, and inasmuch as we do not have 
jurisdiction on any other basis, we will dismiss the appeal.   
  A.  Case Law Applicable to Our    
                  Jurisdictional Analysis 
  1.  Papotto’s Three-Prong Test 
 In Papotto, an ERISA case involving a claim for accidental 
death benefits under an accidental death and dismemberment 
(“AD&D”) policy, the plan administrator denied benefits because 
the plaintiff’s decedent was intoxicated at the time of his 
accidental death.  731 F.3d at 267-68.  After both parties filed 
summary judgment motions, the district court found that a 
provision in the AD&D policy precluding recovery for accidental 
death or injury if the decedent was intoxicated at the time of his 
death or injury was applicable only if there was a causal 
connection between the intoxication and the death or injury.  Id. at 
268.  As a result, the court denied both parties’ summary 
judgment motions and remanded the case to the plan 
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administrator for consideration of whether the decedent’s 
intoxication caused or contributed to his death.  Id.  The insurer 
appealed, and the plaintiff cross-appealed.  Id. at 268-69.    
 We raised the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte and 
considered whether the district court’s order remanding the case 
was final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  731 F.3d at 269-70.  We noted 
that the remand order directed the plan administrator to take two 
actions: “(1) to consider additional evidence, and (2) to read a 
causation requirement into the intoxication exclusion provision 
and determine whether [the decedent’s] intoxication caused or 
contributed to his death.”  Id. at 272.  We considered the case to 
be analogous to cases dealing with appeals from orders 
remanding cases to administrative agencies.  This conclusion led 
us to “distill” a three-prong test for determining the finality of the 
order in that case.  Id. at 270.  Under that test, we may exercise 
jurisdiction over remand orders in ERISA benefit cases when “(1) 
the remand ‘finally resolves’ an issue, (2) the legal issue is 
‘important,’ and (3) denial of immediate review will ‘foreclose 
appellate review’ in the future.”  Id. at 270.5  In fashioning this 
test, we noted that we “consistently [have] accorded significant 
weight to the third factor—i.e., potential for evasion of future 
review.”  Id.  Applying that test in Papotto, we “easily 
determine[d]” that we lacked appellate jurisdiction over the first 
portion of the order remanding for consideration of additional 
evidence.  Id. at 272.  Not only had we held previously that 
“orders directing remands to [administrative agencies] to consider 
additional evidence [are] nonfinal,” but we also reasoned that the 
                                                   
5 We understand the Papotto third prong to mean that it is 
necessary to allow an immediate appeal because there will not be 
an opportunity for an appeal in the future. 
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order failed the first prong of the test that we had distilled 
because it did not “finally resolve” anything.  Id. (alterations in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 The second portion of the order for remand in Papotto 
directing the plan administrator to read a causation requirement 
into the intoxication exclusion provision when evaluating 
Papotto’s case required a separate analysis.  Beginning with the 
first prong of our test—whether the order “finally resolve[d]” the 
underlying issue of the case—we followed the lead of other 
courts of appeals by asking: “Does the remand order make an 
ultimate determination as to eligibility, thus leaving the plan 
administrator with nothing left to do but issue an order?”  Id. at 
273.  We held the order did not “finally resolve[]” the issue of the 
plaintiff’s eligibility and therefore required further action by the 
plan administrator.  Id. at 274.   
 After noting that the second Papotto prong—importance—
was met, id. at 274 n.7, we addressed the third prong, stating that 
“no provision in the ERISA statute permit[s] an insurance 
company to challenge the decision of its own plan administrator in 
district court.”  Id. at 274-75 & n.8.  We nevertheless held that 
the insurer was not left without recourse because the district court 
retained jurisdiction over the case, inasmuch as “administrative 
closings do not end the proceeding.  Rather, they are a practical 
tool used by courts to ‘prune . . . overgrown dockets’ and are 
‘particularly useful in circumstances in which a case, though not 
dead, [is] likely to remain moribund for an appreciable period of 
time.’”  Id. at 275 (first alteration in original) (quoting Freeman v. 
Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 247 (3d Cir. 
2013)).  We also pointed out that a court may reopen an 
administratively closed case—“either on its own or at the request 
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of a party—at any time.”  Id.6  We concluded that the district 
court’s order in Papotto administratively closed the case but did 
not dismiss it.  Overall, we were satisfied that the third Papotto 
test prong for allowing immediate appeal was not met.   
 We further held that the order was not appealable under 
the collateral order doctrine because it did not conclusively 
determine the disputed question, was not effectively unreviewable 
on appeal from a final judgment, and was not separate from the 
merits of the action as it “directly implicate[d] the heart of [the] 
case—whether Mr. Papotto’s death [was] an eligible event for 
distribution of benefits.”  Id.  We therefore dismissed the appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction.  Id. at 277. 
  2.  Mead and Finality Considerations 
 A recent ERISA case from the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, Mead v. Reliastar Life Insurance Co., 768 F.3d 
102 (2d Cir. 2014), is useful in our consideration  of the finality 
of the remand order now on appeal.  Mead concerned an 
employee disability benefits claim in circumstances factually 
similar to those that we address now.  There, the employer, 
Reliastar, provided a group insurance policy to its employees that 
included two kinds of benefits comparable to the STD and LTD 
benefits that Santander provided: own-occupation benefits for up 
to 24 months and any-occupation benefits thereafter.  Id. at 104.  
Mead filed suit under ERISA after Reliastar denied her claim for 
                                                   
6 See also Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S.Ct. 1686, 1691 
(2015) (describing a final decision as “a ruling ‘by which a district 
court disassociates itself from a case’” (quoting Swint v. 
Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 1208 
(1995))). 
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disability benefits under its group policy.  Id. at 104-05.   
 The district court entertained Mead’s suit twice and both 
times remanded it for reconsideration, first because Reliastar’s 
reason for denial of own-occupation benefits did not identify the 
evidence that Reliastar credited and the evidence that it rejected 
in arriving at its decision, and second because the court believed 
that Reliastar “ignored” several physical requirements of Mead’s 
former position, refused to recognize the “ample” objective 
evidence supporting her subjective complaints of pain, and 
provided what the district court believed were “obviously false or 
misleading reasons” for discrediting the conclusions of its own 
neurologist.  Id. at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted).  After 
issuing its second remand order instructing Reliastar to “calculate 
and award” the own-occupation benefits and to determine 
whether Mead was entitled to any-occupation benefits, the district 
court directed its clerk to “close the case,” though it indicated 
that it would entertain a separate motion from Mead for 
prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs.  Id. at 106 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Reliastar appealed from this 
second remand order to the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit.     
 The court of appeals in its analysis of its jurisdiction 
observed that “remands to ERISA plan administrators generally 
are not ‘final’ because, in the ordinary case, they contemplate 
further proceedings by the plan administrator.”  Id. at 108.  The 
court explained that it nonetheless would “examine the content of 
the particular ERISA remand in order to determine its 
appealability,” citing Papotto with approval.  Id.  Further, “to 
preserve an ERISA plan administrator’s ability to obtain appellate 
review of a nonfinal remand order,” the court decided that it 
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generally would “interpret a district court’s remand order as 
[retaining] jurisdiction over the case such that, after a 
determination by the plan administrator on remand, either party 
may seek to reopen the district court proceeding and obtain a final 
judgment.”  Id. at 108-09.   
 The court of appeals concluded that the district court’s 
remand order was not final and appealable under either a 
conventional application of § 1291 or pursuant to the collateral 
order doctrine.  Id. at 113.7  In determining that the remand order 
was not final and appealable, the court reasoned that by 
remanding the issue of Mead’s eligibility for any-occupation 
benefits without addressing the merits of that issue, the district 
court’s order did not “conclusively determine” Reliastar’s liability 
to Mead under her ERISA claim.8  Id. at 209.  Importantly, the 
                                                   
7 As we noted in Papotto, when considering the collateral order 
doctrine, the Supreme Court in Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 
349, 126 S.Ct. 952, 957 (2006), applied a practical construction 
of rather than an exception to § 1291 to bring a collateral order 
appeal within that section.  Papotto, 731 F.3d at 271 n.4. 
 
8 Appellants posit that Mead rejected the approach that Papotto 
adopted when Papotto formulated the test for deciding whether 
remands to ERISA plan administrators are appealable.  This view 
is an overstatement; Mead ultimately declined to decide whether 
to apply its own precedent governing the finality of orders 
remanding cases to administrative agencies, but its analysis 
mirrored our own in Papotto.  See Mead, 768 F.3d at 108-09, 
111-12, 114 (analyzing whether the remand order contemplated 
further proceedings by the plan administrator and whether the 
district court retained jurisdiction over the case, permitting later 
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court rejected Reliastar’s argument that the any-occupation and 
own-occupation portions of the order were separable, reasoning 
that “[w]hile it may be true that Mead’s eligibility for ‘any 
occupation’ benefits has no practical effect on whether she is 
entitled to receive ‘own occupation’ benefits, this has no impact 
on [the court’s] jurisdiction because a district court’s decision that 
does not dispose of all of the plaintiff’s claims for relief is not 
‘final.’”  Id. at 110 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 
U.S. 737, 744, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 1206 (1976)).  Moreover, the court 
determined that even the own-occupation portion of the order was 
not final, as the amount of benefits due had not yet been 
determined, and calculation of that amount was more than a 
“ministerial task.”  Id. at 110-11 & n.5. 
  3.  Carr and Finality of the District Court   
       Order 
 Appellants’ argument that we have jurisdiction because the 
District Court’s order consists of “a final order and a remand 
order” that are “inextricably linked” is predicated in part on our 
opinion in Carr v. American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671 (3d Cir. 
1994).  In Carr, we analyzed the appealability of an order that 
dismissed the American Red Cross as a party and remanded the 
case to a state court because the district court believed that it did 
not have subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of the Red 
Cross as a party and declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the case.  Id. at 674.   
 We explained that the district court’s dismissal order 
needed to satisfy two separate jurisdictional requirements to be 
appealable:  First, to avoid the bar to appellate review in 28 
                                                                                                                  
appellate review). 
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U.S.C. § 1447(d),9 the dismissal order had to be “logically 
precedent to, and separable from” the decision to remand the case 
to state court, a requirement that we held had been satisfied.  Id. 
at 675.  The second requirement was that the dismissal order be 
final.  Id.  We held that the order was final under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 because dismissal of the appeal would “have the practical 
effect of denying later appellate review of [the] district court’s 
underlying order,” as the case was remanded to state court 
without the Red Cross as a party, and, as a result, the state court 
could not review the order dismissing the Red Cross from the 
case.  Carr, 17 F.3d at 678.  We also held that the order was 
appealable under the collateral order doctrine because it 
“conclusively determine[d] [a] disputed question, resolve[d] an 
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, 
and [was] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment.”  Id. at 675-76 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. 
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2458 (1978)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted).  Therefore, we concluded that 
the dismissal order was reviewable on appeal, and we also held 
that the remand order was appealable as well. 
 But the procedural posture of Carr differs from that in our 
case because the District Court’s order here is not final under 
either a conventional application of § 1291 or the collateral order 
doctrine.  For the reasons we explain below, the District Court 
retained jurisdiction over Stevens’s claims after the remand, and 
                                                   
9 “An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was 
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an 
order remanding a case to the State court from which it was 
removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be 
reviewable by appeal or otherwise.”  28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). 
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any party will be able to move to reopen the case at some future 
date following which the parties will be able to appeal from the 
District Court’s orders in the case including the earlier January 
29, 2014 remand order.  Cf. Carr, 17 F.3d at 677 (distinguishing 
as unappealable those orders that, “though unreviewable in 
federal court, would be reviewable by [a] state appellate court on 
appeal”).    
  B.  Analysis of Our Jurisdiction  
  We principally analyze whether we have jurisdiction over 
this appeal under the three-prong test outlined in Papotto: (1) 
whether the remand finally resolves an issue, (2) whether the 
legal issue is important, and (3) whether unless there is immediate 
review, there can never be appellate review of the remand order.  
731 F.3d at 270.   
 We will consider first whether the remand order made a 
final resolution of Stevens’s LTD disability eligibility.  It is surely 
clear that the second part of the District Court’s order, which 
instructs the plan administrator to consider fully Stevens’s LTD 
benefits claim, does not “end[] the litigation on the merits and 
leave[] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”  
Coopers, 437 U.S. at 467, 98 S.Ct. at 2457 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The opposite is true because the remand order’s 
plain terms require the plan administrator to make a new 
adjudication; the first prong of the three-part Papotto test to allow 
immediate appeal therefore has not been satisfied, as the order 
determines neither whether Stevens is eligible for LTD benefits 
nor the amount of those benefits.  Papotto, 731 F.3d at 273; see 
Liberty Mut., 424 U.S. at 742-44, 96 S.Ct. at 1206-07.   
 While we recognize that if Stevens qualifies for full STD 
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benefits, as he does under the District Court’s decision, he will 
have satisfied the LTD requirement that he be unable to perform 
his own occupation duties during the LTD 180-day elimination 
period, he must do more than obtain a favorable determination on 
that issue to be eligible for LTD benefits.  To qualify for LTD 
benefits after the expiration of the 180-day period, Stevens also 
must demonstrate that he cannot perform the duties of his own 
occupation for the next 24 months and thereafter cannot perform 
the duties of any occupation.  These requirements are distinct 
from the requirements for eligibility for STD benefits and, in the 
second situation, are more demanding because to qualify for STD 
benefits, an employee merely needs to demonstrate that he cannot 
perform the duties of his own occupation during the initial 180-
day period.   
 A determination of whether the District Court’s order 
insofar as it reinstated Steven’s STD benefits satisfies Papotto’s 
first prong requires a more complex analysis.  We acknowledge 
that the Court’s direction to the plan administrator with respect to 
benefits under the STD plan was to undertake what arguably is a 
“ministerial task.”  After all, inasmuch as Stevens was awarded 
STD benefits before the remand, it appears that Liberty Mutual 
only needs to multiply the amount Stevens previously was 
awarded per month by the remaining number of months of 
benefits to which he is entitled pursuant to the District Court’s 
decision under the STD policy and add appropriate interest.  But 
we need not decide whether the order “finally resolves” the issue 
of STD benefits because, as we will explain, the order is not 
appealable under Papotto’s third and most important prong.  
 In considering Papotto’s third prong, we determine that 
our dismissal of this appeal for lack of jurisdiction will not mean 
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that there can never be an appellate review of the order awarding 
Stevens STD benefits, though Liberty Mutual and Santander 
suggest otherwise.  Our dismissal of an appeal from a remand 
order in an ERISA action generally would not preclude a party 
from filing an appeal of the remand order at a later time.  Our 
examination of the case law satisfies us that any of the parties—
including Santander and Liberty Mutual—can preserve its right to 
appeal to this Court to challenge the District Court’s decision by 
filing a motion to reopen the case in the District Court after the 
remand to the plan administrator.  If Liberty Mutual denies 
Stevens LTD benefits, he can seek to reopen the case and appeal 
the decision denying the benefits to the District Court, and, after 
the District Court’s decision, one or both parties may appeal to 
this Court.  If Liberty Mutual grants LTD benefits on remand, 
Santander can move to reopen the case and obtain entry of a final 
judgment, from which it may appeal the District Court’s January 
29, 2014 order.  In the meantime, Santander can seek a stay of the 
District Court’s order to award STD benefits pending further 
proceedings.  See Mead, 768 F.3d at 112.10     
                                                   
10 At oral argument, appellants pointed out that they sought such a 
stay from the District Court, but the Court has not ruled on their 
motion.  In considering the motion for a stay of the order to 
award STD benefits, the Court should be mindful of our inquiry 
under Papotto, which focuses on whether dismissing the appeal 
will prevent future review as a practical matter, 731 F.3d at 270, 
and thus should consider the feasibility of Santander recouping its 
payment of STD benefits, in the absence of a stay, if such benefits 
are ultimately determined to have been awarded wrongfully.  We 
note that the district court in Mead granted a stay under similar 
circumstances.  See 768 F.3d at 106.   
 20 
 
 It is also significant that the District Court did not intend to 
enter a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 
as it did not make the findings required by that rule to enter a final 
judgment on either the STD or LTD claim.  See Elliott v. 
Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 229 (3d Cir. 2012); Powers 
v. Southland Corp., 4 F.3d 223, 237 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The 
dismissal of a party or a particular cause of action does not 
necessarily make a decision final.”).  While partial review might 
be efficient in this case, our jurisdictional concerns are paramount: 
we must “resist[] the temptation to abandon the deeply held 
distaste for piecemeal litigation simply because we are presented 
with a case whose immediate resolution would clarify the law and 
terminate a drawn-out controversy.”  Papotto, 731 F.3d at 276 
(alteration in original) (quoting Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. v. 
Consol. Rail Corp., 864 F.2d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 1988)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 We make clear here that regardless of delay or resource 
costs, this Court generally will consider remands to ERISA plan 
administrators nonfinal because, in the ordinary case, they 
contemplate that the plan administrator will engage in further 
proceedings.  We also make clear that we will interpret a district 
court’s remand order to a plan administrator in an ERISA case as 
including a reservation of the court’s jurisdiction over the case so 
that, after a determination by the administrator on remand, either 
party may seek to reopen the district court proceedings and obtain 
a final judgment.  See, e.g., Young v. Prudential Ins. Co., 671 
F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012).  The finality of an order 
ultimately will turn on the substance of the district court’s order, 
such that even a district court’s assertion of finality cannot 
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establish appellate jurisdiction to review a decision that is not 
otherwise “final” for purposes of § 1291.   
 Though appellants ask that we sever the STD portion of 
the District Court’s order and review it now, we decline to do so. 
 In making this request, appellants rely principally on City of 
Waco v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 293 U.S. 140, 55 
S.Ct. 6 (1934).  However, we consistently have interpreted City 
of Waco as permitting severance and appellate review only where 
refusing to do so would render a portion of a remand order 
unreviewable.  Compare Powers, 4 F.3d at 237 (holding that an 
order allowing a relation back amendment and remanding to state 
court was unreviewable because “no doctrine . . . would bar the 
state court from reviewing the federal district court’s 
interlocutory decision to allow the relation back amendment,” and 
thus, there was no “right at stake the value of which effectively 
will be lost if the order is not immediately appealable”), with 
Beneficial Consumer Disc. Co. v. Poltonowicz, 47 F.3d 91, 93 
(3d Cir. 1995) (exercising jurisdiction over an appeal from an 
order dismissing a cross-claim against the IRS on grounds of 
sovereign immunity but not over an order remanding remaining 
claims to state court).  Here, the District Court has retained 
jurisdiction and there is no need for us to entertain a piecemeal 
appeal. 
  C.  Constitutionality of Remand to the Plan  
       Administrator 
 Stevens argues that orders remanding cases to plan 
administrators are not permissible under ERISA and “may even be 
unconstitutional.”  (Appellee’s br. 34.)  Stevens accordingly 
contends that we should order Liberty Mutual to pay both the 
STD and LTD benefits instead of remanding the matter for a 
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determination of Stevens’s eligibility for LTD benefits even 
though there has not been an administrative or judicial 
determination that he is entitled to benefits during the 24-month 
“Own Occupation” period following the elimination period, nor 
has there been any determination that he is entitled to benefits 
during the “Any Occupation” period that follows.   
 We, however, will not address this request on the merits as 
it is not properly before us because Stevens did not file a cross-
appeal from the District Court’s order remanding the case.  
“Absent a cross-appeal, an appellee may ‘urge in support of a 
decree any matter appearing in the record, although his argument 
may involve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court,’ but 
may not ‘attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own 
rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary.’”  El 
Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 479, 119 S.Ct. 
1430, 1434-35 (1999) (quoting United States v. Am. Rwy. 
Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S.Ct. 560, 564 (1924)).  
Stevens is seeking impermissibly to enlarge his rights under the 
District Court’s order as he is attempting to obtain an award of 
LTD benefits.  Therefore, he is doing more than attacking the 
reasoning underlying the District Court’s order; he is seeking an 
award of previously unawarded relief, and he cannot obtain that 
relief in the absence of a cross-appeal.  See El Paso Natural Gas, 
526 U.S. at 479, 119 S.Ct. at 1434-35; cf. Blum v. Bacon, 457 
U.S. 132, 137 n.5, 102 S.Ct. 2355, 2359 n.5 (1982) (holding that 
failure to file a cross-appeal did not bar an argument where 
accepting the argument would not “alter the relief ordered in the 
judgment”).   
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss this appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction and will remand the case to the District Court 
for further proceedings. 
 
 
